Abstract-The advent of energy "prosumers" that not only consume but also produce energy, advocates a sharing market to encourage energy exchange. Motivated by the recent technology of online platforms, this paper proposes a simple but effective mechanism for energy sharing by generalizing demand bidding. Towards this end, a generic supply-demand function (SDF) is devised for individual prosumers to determine their role of buyer or seller in the sharing market, where the outcome is shown to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) among prosumers. The existence and uniqueness of NE are proved. Properties of the equilibrium price are uncovered. Compared with individual decision-making, the disutility of each prosumer can always be reduced via purchasing cheaper energy in the sharing market, leading to a Pareto improvement. It is revealed that the total cost of prosumers decreases with the price elasticity and the sharing market equilibrium can achieve social optimum when the number of prosumers becomes large enough. It is also found that introducing competition benefits social welfare. Case studies confirm the theoretical results with analyses on the impacts of several key factors. This work is expected to provide insights on understanding and designing future energy sharing markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE proliferation of distributed wind, solar power and energy storage have been endowing traditional "pure" consumers with capability of generation, precipitating the advent of prosumers [1] . Different from traditional consumers, prosumers can not only consume, but also produce energy. Hence they can choose to either buy or sell energy when participating in an energy market, which provides an opportunity to flexibly exchange energy so as to enhance both the individual utility and social efficiency [2] . In this context, a well-designed market mechanism is desired to encourage individual prosumers to participate in energy sharing. This paper proposes a simple but effective mechanism based on generalized demand bidding, making an initial step to better understand the behavior of prosumers in energy sharing.
Nowadays, the advent of online platforms and applications have been enabling resource sharing in more and more sectors, such as ride-sharing (e.g., Uber, Lyft) [3] , room-sharing (e.g., AirBnB) [4] , workplace-sharing (e.g., Upwork, Amazon Mechanical Turk) [5] . These sharing platforms allow people to provide their idle goods for someone just in need and earn profit from doing so, resulting in a win-win game. These successes motivate a new paradigm of high-efficiency energy utilization in power systems, where energy prosumers could share their energy via online platforms in a similar way [6] .
No surprising, such a paradigm has been gaining increasing attentions from both the academia and the public.
Existing studies in economics have investigated the operation of resource sharing. The benefits and drawbacks of sharing economy is discussed in [7] . The main difficulty of sharing platform construction is the design of an appropriate sharing mechanism, which means how the products be provided, how the market be cleared and how the revenue be allocated. Performance of typical sharing platforms is studied in [8] - [10] and also their impacts on the social welfare [11] . The influence of prices and subsidies is revealed in [12] . A review of sharing economy can be found in [13] .
As for energy sharing, the potential of game-theoretic approaches was summarized in [14] , including the applications in electric vehicles (EV), demand-side energy resource (DER) and storage managements. The economic efficiencies of autarky scheme, sharing scheme and aggregation scheme were quantitatively compared in [15] , showing that energy sharing can achieve near-optimal efficiency without a central coordinator, which is a promising scheme for future energy market organization. An exchange article by article sharing paradigm was investigated. Random sharing clearing price in a storage investment problem is characterized in [16] . A simplified time-of-use (TOU) model with peak price and offpeak price was used. Above work initially explores the problem and opportunity of sharing in smart grid and the models are relatively abstract and simple. More detailed analytical studies related to resource sharing can be roughly cast into the following three categories.
Two-sided market with clearing price. It is assumed that there is a third-party platform. The sellers report the amount of products they are willing to share or their cost coefficients; the buyers report the amount of products they want or the money they are willing to pay. After receiving all the bids, the third-party sharing platform solves an optimization problem with the objective function of social welfare maximization or self-revenue maximization and clears the market. Ref. [17] provides interesting insights into the tradeoff between revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. The clearing price of sharing market is analyzed in [18] . Incentive design for electric vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing is investigated in [19] . System constraints such as energy-flow limits can be taken into account in the two-sided market analysis. However, since the supply and demand statuses of participants are predetermined, it can not fully capture the behaviors of prosumers who can choose to purchase or sell changeably.
Single-sided market with set price. Different from the two-sided market, it assumes that the statuses of participants are symmetric, which means all of them can flexibly choose to purchase or sell. The benefits from sharing are distributed among prosumers via prices set by the sharing platform. An hour-ahead optimal pricing model of energy sharing management platform is proposed based under the framework of Stackelberg game in [20] . Energy sharing among photovoltaic (PV) prosumers is considered in [21] , taking into account uncertainty of renewable energy generation. Two kinds of sharing schemes, the direct sharing (within one time period) and the buffered sharing (across different time periods), are discussed. A supply demand ratio based pricing algorithm is adopted in [22] for the energy sharing in PV prosumers. In the above studies, the sharing prices are set by the platform via solving a Stackelberg game, in which the upper level is the platform's pricing problem and the lower level prosumers' decision making problems. The impact of one prosumer's strategy on the other prosumers' decision is not fully captured.
Single-sided market with re-allocation. In this kind of sharing, the benefit distribution is achieved via re-allocation instead of price regulation. The main difficulty stems from the design of re-allocation scheme. The renowned VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [23] could be regarded as an example. Under VCG, each agent not only gains its own value but also an additional payment based on an arbitrary function of the values of the other agents. Although the VCG re-allocation approach is ease to implement, it is not selfbudget balancing as extra bonuses outside the sharing market is required. A cost re-allocation method for a group of electricity storages is presented in [24] , resulting in a cooperative game. A coalitional game based algorithm was proposed in [25] for energy exchange among microgrids. A conceptual design for the DERs sharing is proposed in [26] , where an aggregator coordinates all DERs in real-time operation and evaluates coordination surplus, which is split between aggregators and prosumers. However, the redistribution after a sharing transaction is difficult in practice, as it requires some private information of individual participants, e.g. the storage capacity and the cost coefficient. This paper proposes a simple but transparent and effective energy sharing mechanism based on generalized demand bidding. A similar framework is known as the supply function bidding [27] , [28] in demand response programs. Under this mechanism, each seller submits his supply function to the auctioneer, then the auctioneer sets a market clearing price according to the submitted supply functions and the expected total load shedding. Supply function bidding can fully capture the impact of seller's bid on his contracted quantity as well as the market clearing price, and is effective in competitive markets [29] . When it comes to the sharing market, the situation is more complex since the prosumers not only aim to minimize his cost but should also maintain power balancing. Besides, sellers and buyers coexist and can change their roles from time to time, and the equilibrium quantity is not known in advanced. In this regard, we generalize the supply function to a generic supply-demand function (SDF), based on which we build a sharing market mechanism for energy prosumers. This work possesses three salient features: 1) Sharing mechanism design. A generic supply-demand function is proposed, enabling a generalized demand biding based sharing mechanism. In contrast to the two-sided market based analysis, any participant can be a prosumer that aims to minimize his own disutility. Moreover, different from the single-sided market with set price, the mutual impacts among prosumers are considered, which can better characterize the market behavior. The model encapsulating the decision making of prosumers turns out to be a generalized Nash game (GNG), which can be further reduced to a standard Nash game. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilbrium are proved.
2) Provable properties of the sharing mechanism. Properties of the sharing equilibrium price are disclosed. It is proved that every prosumer's cost is no more than with individual decision-making, leading to a Pareto improvement and meaning that every prosumer has the motivation to participate in sharing. Moreover, the total cost of all prosumers decreases with the price elasticity and when the number of prosumers is large enough, the sharing market will lead to the same outcome as the social optimum. It is also revealed that the proposed generalized demand bidding based sharing mechanism is budget self-balancing and no private information is needed for re-allocation, which is easier to implement compared with the re-allocation based schemes.
3) Impacts of competition on social efficiency. The basic model is based on a perfectly competitive situation, in which every prosumer owns and controls only one resource. We further investigate a more realistic case, in which a prosumer could possess multiple resources. A special case provides a proof of concept that social cost can be reduced by spreading the resources among more prosumers which means more competition is introduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The mathematical formulations of energy prosumers and description of the energy sharing mechanism are presented in Section II; some basic properties of the sharing game are given in Section III; The impact of competition on social welfare is studied in Section IV; Illustrative examples are provided in Section V. Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section VI.
II. GAME MODEL OF ENERGY SHARING

A. Energy Prosumers
In this paper, we consider the decision-making problems of a set of prosumers I , indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2..., I}. There are N kinds of resources, indexed by n ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., N}, which can be a distributed generator (DG), virtual power plant (VPP) and etc. First, we consider the case under perfectly competitive market, where each prosumer i owns one kind of resource, and we have I = N. To distinguish from the case under imperfect competitive market, we use N to represent the number of prosumers here. The fixed amount of energy prosumer i consumes is D 0 i , and is satisfied by the amount of energy it generates p 0 i as well as the energy bought from the grid E 0 i . These prosumers take part in a demand response program, and the required amount of load reduction for prosumer i is a given value D i , which means the amount of energy it bought from the grid needs to be reduced by However, the result under individual decision-making may not be the most efficient if prosumers with different marginal disutilities are allowed to trade with others. In such a circumstance, the design of an effective profit allocation scheme, from which all prosumers take part in sharing can benefit, is desired. The traditional supply function bidding in demand response program cannot be applied because of the simultaneous non-deterministic clearing quantity and clearing price as a prosumer can changeably acts as either a producer or a consumer. Hence a more general bidding mechanism, which can reflect prosumers' willingness to buy or sell energy while determining both the clearing quantity and price, are necessary.
B. Generic Supply-Demand Function
In this subsection, we propose a generic supply-demand function by generalizing the conventional supply function, so as to consider the situation where the participant can flexibly change his role between a seller and a buyer.
In the sharing market, the demand (or supply) function of each prosumer can be expressed by
where λ c is the market clearing price, q i is the amount of energy (q i > 0 means he is a buyer and gets energy from the sharing market, q i < 0 means he is a seller and sells energy to the sharing market). a i < 0 represents price elasticity and b i shows his willingness to buy. For simplification, we assume all prosumer have the same price sensitivity, i.e. a i = a < 0, i ∈ N . The average purchase desire is defined asb = (∑ i b i )/N. The market clears when the net quantity ∑ i q i = 0 and the obtained sharing price is
here b i ≥b implies prosumer i is more willing to buy than the average. We have q i = aλ c + b i ≥ 0, and the prosumer appears to be a buyer. Similarly, a prosumer who has less willingness to buy than the average (b i ≤b) turns to be a seller (q i ≤ 0). In consequence, the statuses of prosumers are determined spontaneously by their purchase desires, which enable a simple but effective sharing mechanism, as we explain.
C. Energy Sharing Mechanism
The sharing mechanism follows these three steps.
Step 1: Estimate the value of price elasticity a via historical data. Each prosumer i bids b i to the sharing platform. The average purchase desire isb = ∑ i b i /N
Step 2: Clear the sharing market by setting price to λ c (b) = − ∑ i b i /Na, which is called the equilibrium price. The amount of energy prosumer i gets is
Step 3: If b i ≥b, the amount of energy q i (b) ≥ 0, which means prosumer i will buy q i (b) from the sharing market and his payment is λ c (b)q i (b). Otherwise, if b i ≤b, the amount of energy q i (b) ≤ 0, which means prosumer i will sell −q i (b) to the sharing market and he will get −λ c (b)q i (b).
Under this setting, the sharing market clears when
S is the set of sellers, D is the set of buyers and each prosumer i belongs to either S or D, which means I = S ∪ D. Hence equation (3) also implies
D. Energy Sharing as A Generalized Nash Game
It is easy to verify that the setting price λ c (b) clears the market. When participating the sharing market, the optimization problem of each prosumer i ∈ I becomes In summary, the sharing game consist of the following elements: 1) the set of prosumers I = {1, 2, ..., I}; 2) action sets X i (b −i ) 1 ,∀i, and strategy space X = ∏ i X i ; 3) cost functions
For simplicity, we use G = {I , X, Π} to denote the sharing game (5) in an abstract form.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE SHARING GAME
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that the GNG model of energy sharing problems can be reduced into a standard Nash game, based on which we prove the existence and uniqueness of its equilibrium.
Denote by b j the bids of other prosumer j ( j = i). From (5c), we have
Substituting into (5b) yields
Using b i to represent p i and λ c (b), the GNG (5) degenerates into a equivalent standard Nash game (8) .
The subscribe −i means all players in I except i
Direct computation shows that, the second derivative of the objective function is 2 c i
> 0, implying each prosumer solves a strictly convex optimization.
and b * i =b i (p * ). The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A. Proposition 1 is fundamental since it ensures that the proposed sharing game is well defined. Furthermore, it implies that the NE computation can be greatly simplified into solving a simpler optimization problem (9), which is strictly convex.
B. Individual Rationality of Prosumers
The next proposition shows that all the prosumers are incentivized to share by comparing the costs of the individual decision-making and the sharing game (5) at equilibrium.
Let Π i (p * i , b * ) be the cost of prosumer i at the NE of sharing game G = {I , X, Π} defined by (5) , and f i (D i ) the cost of prosumer i with his individual optimal decision. Proposition 2. We have
moreover, (10) holds with strictly inequality for at least one i unless the unique optimal solution of (9) is p * i = D i , ∀i. The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix B. It says that with the proposed sharing mechanism, a Pareto improvement can be achieved for all prosumers, since the cost of each prosumer is no worse than making decisions individually. Hence, the sharing mechanism provides positive incentives for prosumers to participate in the sharing market, which is crucial for the market design.
C. Sharing Price and Prosumers' Behavior
In this subsection, we clarify the relationship between the sharing price λ c that clears the market and prosumer's marginal disutility, as well as the resulting prosumers' behavior. Definition 2. (Marginal Disutility) The marginal disutility of prosumer i, denoted by md i , is defined as
is the NE of the sharing game (5). Then 1) the sharing price at equilibrium is given by
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix C. Proposition 3 says that, the clearing price at the NE is simply the average marginal disutility of all prosumers participating in the sharing market. Moreover, the prosumers whose marginal disutility is larger than the average (which equals λ c ) have q i (b * ) > 0 and hence will buy energy, while whose marginal cost is lower than the average have q i (b * ) < 0 and hence will sell energy. Under the proposed sharing mechanism, a prosumer with higher/lower marginal disutility produces less/more and purchases/sells in the sharing market.
D. Social Efficiency
To investigate the social efficiency of the proposed sharing mechanism, consider the social planner's problem:
Definition 3. (Socially Optimal)p is socially optimal ifp is the unique optimal solution of (11).
Optimal solution of (11) is different from the case under individual decision-making, except for the case in which p i = D i ∀i ∈ I happens to be the optimal solution to problem (11) . The difference in their optimal values interprets the loss of social welfare. Next we reveal that the proposed energy sharing mechanism can effectively reduce the loss of social welfare.
Invoking Proposition 1, it is easy to see, as the number of prosumers N in model (9) approaches infinity, the NE of the sharing problem (5) would turn to be identical to the solution to social optimization problem (11) . Next we show the asymptotic convergence as N → ∞. (5) andp(N) be the socially optimal solution of (11). Then, we have
and the average cost difference
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix D. Proposition 4 says that the proposed sharing mechanism asymptotically converges to the social optimum when there is an large enough number of prosumers in the sharing market.
Similarly, the impact of price elasticity can be analyzed by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let (p * (a), b * (a)) be the unique NE of (5) with price elasticity equals to a < 0. Then, we have ∑ i∈I f i (p * i (a)) is decreasing in |a|.
The proof of proposition 5 can be found in Appendix E. It reveals that when |a| becomes larger, which means the prosumers are more sensitive to the change of price, the total social cost under sharing decreases and becomes closer to the social optimal cost. It is worthy nothing that, because ∑ i∈I (aλ c + b i )λ c = 0 holds, the group of prosumers are budget self-balancing. It implies that no extra bonus is needed to motivate the sharing market, which is a main superiority compared with the renown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.
IV. IMPACTS OF COMPETITION
Above analysis assumes a simplified competitive market, where each prosumer owns only one resource and there exists no monopoly power. Next we analyze a more complicated situation, in which prosumers could own multiple resources.
Assume that there are I multi-resource prosumers (MRP) indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., I}. Each prosumer i owns K i kinds of resources labeled by k ∈ K i = {1, 2, ..., K i }. The corresponding energy productions are
i . However, we assume there are still N resources in total, which means ∑ i∈I K i = N. The multi-resource prosumer (MRP) i ∈ I can either carry out the demand response command individually by solving the following problem
or take part in the sharing market by solving
Following the similar process as in Section III, we can easily prove again that the proposed sharing mechanism can benefit all MRPs and the equilibrium sharing price reflects the average marginal disutility.
Definition 4. (Social Optimal for MRP)p is socially optimal (or the most efficient) ifp solves min
If I = 1, the sharing problem for MRP (13) becomes the social optimal problem (14) . If I = N, the sharing problem for MRP (13) degenerates to the sharing problem in the previous sections. If 1 < I < N, the following propositions hold.
Proposition 6. The marginal disutilities of the resources for a prosumer are equal, which means 3
Proposition 6 can be directly deduced from the KKT condition. So we omit the proof here.
Given p := (p i , ∀i), we defineλ (p) :
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7.
There exists a unique NE for the sharing problem with MRP (13). Moreover, a strategy profile (p * , b * ) is the unique NE if and only if, ∀i ∈ I , p * i is the unique solution of (16) .
and b * i =b i (p * ). The proof of Proposition 7 can be found in Appendix F. Proposition 7 extends the result of existence and uniqueness of the NE in the sharing game from the single-resource case to the multi-resource one, and again provides an effective way to simplify the computation of NE.
Then we analyze the change in efficiency based on model (16) . Generally speaking, as I varies from 1 to N, the change in the total socially optimal cost may not be monotonous. So we only consider a special case in which all c k i = c, ∀k, ∀i and K i = K I , ∀i and gives the following proposition.
Let (I, K I , D) denotes a scenario that there are I prosumers, each has K I resources and the required load adjustment for prosumer i is D i . Then, the scenario (
is an equal partition of (I, K I , D) when there exists an Z ∈ Z + , such that I ′ = ZI and K I = ZK I ′ , the resources one prosumer possesses and required load adjustment is distributed equally to Z prosumers and satisfies, ∀i, ∀z 1 
where p * is the NE under scenario (I, K I , D).
Definition 5. (Variance of marginal disutility)
The variance of marginal utilities md k * i , ∀k ∈ K I , ∀i ∈ I is defined as
Proposition 8. Suppose c k i = c, ∀i ∈ I , ∀k ∈ K i and (p * (I), b * (I)) is the unique NE of the sharing problem for MRP (13) with I > 1. For any I prosumers with the same number of resources, i.e. K i = K I , ∀i ∈ I , there always exists an equal partition of (I,
The proof can be found in Appendix G. It shows that the system under I = 1 is the most efficient; otherwise, introducing competition by spreading resources benefits social welfare. Proposition 8 only considers a very special case. In Section IV, we provide empirical results of numerical experiments to further confirm this property.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, numerical experiments are presented to illustrate theoretical results. First, a simple case is used to illustrate the basic setup. Then, the impacts of several factors are analyzed, including the number of prosumers, their price elasticities as well as the impact of competition.
A. Benchmark Case
The simplest scenario with two prosumers is taken as an illustrative example. p 1 and p 2 are the output adjustment of prosumer 1 and 2. We assume the price elasticity a = −1, the cost coefficients c 1 = 2, d 1 = 3 and c 2 = 4, d 2 = 5. The required demand reduction are D 1 = 1 and D 2 = 2. The optimal output adjustments and the corresponding costs when making decisions individually (IDL), taking part in the sharing market (SMK) and the social optimal (SCO) are shown in Table I . The best response curves of two prosumers are shown in Fig.1 . Table I , we can find that when the prosumers take part in sharing, their individual costs all decrease (prosumer 1 from 5.00 to 2.00, and prosumer 2 from 26.00 to 21.00), so does the social total cost, confirming Proposition 2. The relative social cost difference 4 between IDL and SCO is 35.75% while the relative social cost difference between SMK and SCO is 4 Relative social cost difference(IDL,SCO)= 0.73%, showing that the sharing mechanism can greatly reduce the social total cost. The intersection of best response curves in Fig.1 gives the sharing market equilibrium, which is (b 1 , b 2 ) = (11, 13) and the corresponding equilibrium output adjustment is (p 1 , p 2 ) = (2.0, 1.0), which is the same as the results in Table I offered by the proposed equivalent model (9), verifying Proposition 1.
B. Impact of the Number of Prosumers
We change the number N from 2 to 30. We assume that
are randomly chosen within the upper and lower bounds and 10 scenarios are tested. For each of the 10 random scenario, the average cost difference in Proposition 4 is plotted in Fig.2 and the variance of marginal disutilities in definition 5 (with K I = 1) is plotted in Fig. 3 , both as functions of N.
In Fig.2 , the average cost with sharing is always larger than the average optimal social cost but the gap shrinks sharply with the increase of N in all scenarios, validating Proposition 4. When N increases, the variance of marginal disutility also drops sharply, implying that the marginal disutilities of all prosumers under sharing become closer and all prosumers converge to the social optimum, as shown in Fig. 3 .
C. Impact of Price Elasticity
When price elasticity coefficient a varies in [−3.5, −1], the social costs under NE are shown in Fig. 4 . The optimal social cost is marked by a dash line. From the figure, when the absolute value of a increases, the social cost under sharing is decreasing and gets closer to the optimal social cost. This is in accordance with Proposition 5.
D. Impact of Competition
A special case, in which all c k i = c, ∀k, ∀i and K i = K I , ∀i, is analyzed in Section IV, showing that introducing competition improves social welfare. However, the general case is difficult to prove. Here, we first test cases with different c k i but the same K i ; and cases with different c owned by one prosumer and the social optimal are achieved. When I ≥ 2, the relative cost decreases with I, demonstrating that competition improves economic efficiency as stated in Proposition 8. This property extends to the case when K i are different as shown in Fig. 6 .
VI. CONCLUSION
Prosumers endowed with distributed generators are emerging nowadays, providing a great opportunity for energy sharing. By allowing prosumers to exchange energy with each other, energy sharing can greatly reduce the cost of prosumers while enhancing social efficiency. To promote energy sharing in smart grid, a simple but transparent and effective mechanism is proposed based on the generic supply-demand function. This paper establishes fundamental properties of such a sharing market by proving the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium, disclosing the individual rationality of prosumers, characterizing the sharing price, comparing the social efficiency, as well as investigating the market impact of competition. Both theoretical analysis and case studies justify the effectiveness of the proposed sharing mechanism.
In contrast to the existing works, the proposed mechanism considers the choosability of prosumers to become a seller or buyer, the equilibrium price set by market sharing, and the fairness and operability of profit allocation. It is expected that this work provides a fundamental, though initial, framework for energy sharing problems. Future research directions include analyzing the behavior of such mechanism when coping with uncertainty due to the integration of renewables.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Given the other prosumers' bids b j , j = i, prosumer i solves a strictly convex optimization problem. Thus, the KKT condition below is the sufficient and necessary condition of the optimal solution.
where µ i is dual variable of constraint (5b) and η i is the dual variable of constraint (5c) for prosumer i.
Problem (9) is also a strictly convex optimization problem and the KKT condition is 
Then with (A.1a) we have
Then we can always find a ξ such that (A.2a) is satisfied. As a result, p * is also the optimal solution of (9). Obviously, we have
will be proved latter in Appendix C.
⇐: If p * is the optimal solution of problem (9), then by letting
It is easy to prove that it satisfied the KKT condition (A.1). In consequence, the sharing problem (5) is equivalent to the central decision-making problem (9) . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. Under SDF-based sharing mechanism, given other prosumers strategies b j , j = i, by choosing
, which means prosumer i can acheive the same cost as under individual decision-making.
Because each prosumer solves a minimization problem, so that we always have
In consequence, a Pareto improvement is achieved for all prosumers.
If p * i = D i does not hold for all i, then as p * is the unique optimal solution of problem (9), we always have
so that at least one strict inequality of (10) 
be the unique solution of constaints (5b), (5c). Then, for any fixed
Derivatives of (5b) and (5c) with respect to p i are
Solving the equations we have
The first term 2c i p i +d i is the marginal disutility of prosumer i; the second term λ c is the marginal cost he needs to pay when buying from the market regardless of the mutual impact of different prosumers; the third term (11) . Asp i is the optimal solution of (11), we always have
2) With the KKT conditions, we can obtain the optimal solutions to problem (9) and (11) are
respectively. Moreover, we havē
Consequently, we havē
. Then there arē
Furthermore, it is easy to see
LetC := 
The optimal solution of (9) and (11) This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. Suppose that 0 < |a 1 | < |a 2 |, and p 1 * is the NE of (5) with a = a 1 , and p 2 * is the NE with a = a 2 . According to Proposition 1, p 1 * and p 2 * are the unique optimal point of problem (9) It is easy to verify that (F.7) satisfies KKT condition (F.1), and thus, (p * , b * ) is the NE of the sharing problem (13), which completes the proof.
